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Improving Securities Regulation in the EC:
The French Example
Introduction
Five years almost to the day, after Germany's unconditional surren-
der, France is taking the first decisive step in the construction of Eu-
rope, and is associating Germany with it ... Europe will not be made
all at once, or as a single whole; it will be built of concrete achieve-
ments which first create de facto solidarity.
(Robert Schuman, French politician, in a speech to a press confer-
ence at the Quai d'Orsay on May 9, 1950, the day on which he pro-
posed the Schuman plan for a European Coal and Steel Community,
the first of the European Communities.)'
The internationalization of the world's securities markets 2 pro-
vides a solid example of the effect that one area of harmonization of
European law has on the rest of the world. The directives issued by
the European Community (EC) 3 in the area of securities regulation
I JOHN PAXTON, DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 228 (2nd ed. 1982).
2 For a synopsis of the underlying forces behind such globalization, see, e.g., John T.
Thomas, Icarus and His Waxen Wings: Congress Attempts to Address the Challenges of Insider Trad-
ing in a Globalized Securities Market, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 99, 105 (1990).
S The idea of a united Europe dates back to medieval times with the religion-ori-
ented conception of a united Christendom. Although religious freedom was often at stake,
the benefits of a united Europe were acknowledged early on by philosophers, scholars and
even politicians. Such benefits included easier travel, stronger defense capabilities, diver-
sification and increased availability of goods and services, and broadened opportunity for
the exchange of ideas. R. OWEN & M. DYNES, THE TIMES GUIDE TO 1992, BRITAIN IN A
EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS, A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 39-40 (1989).
Later proponents of these ideas, however, failed in practice to honor the essentially
moral premise of unity by seeking to accomplish the end by unjustifiable and forceful
means. Charlemagne, Napoleon and Hitler are, perhaps, the most famous and extreme
examples of military leaders in history who attempted to unify Europe under largely abso-
lutist control. The backlash did not prompt the abandonment of the idea of unification
but rather fostered a more democratic approach to its attainment. After World War II, the
approach concentrated on efforts towards unification of defense. However, with the
French veto of the European Defense Community in 1954, this defense-first orientation
was dropped in favor of economic union as a first step. Id.
In the early 1950's, economic union was fostered by the French. On May 9, 1950,
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman called for the pooling of coal and steel re-
sources of France, Germany and other European nations. To coordinate this effort, Schu-
man advocated the creation of a transnational institution empowered to legislate relevant
policy and enforce ensuing regulations. This led to the establishment of the first official
European Community: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) establishing
supra-national regulatory and enforcement institutions and chaired by Frenchman Jean
Monnet. Led by Monnet, the foreign ministers of the ECSC member states - France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg - began
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are intended to facilitate international trading of securities and pro-
mote the image of integrity in the European markets. 4 No doubt, the
EC is closer to meeting these goals, as evidenced by its large share of
the increase in multinational stock listings, its availability of foreign
securities, and consequently, the overall volume of trading interna-
tionally. 5 Yet, this growth in cross-border securities transactions is
not without repercussion, in particular the parallel growth in cross-
border violations of securities laws. 6 With internationalization, na-
tional and transnational securities regulation is becoming increas-
ingly complex, as laws vary from country to country. Though some
similarities can be found, innumerable differences have produced
ambiguities capitalized upon by past, current, and prospective insid-
ers and tippees.
Mr. Richard Breerdon, Chairman of the SEC, has cautioned, "it
is important that national borders should not be used to shield
fraud."' 7 To illustrate the SEC's concern, one-third of the recent
insider trading cases involved some form of international investiga-
tion, thus making it essential to be able to pursue offenders across
national borders.8 From the United States perspective, the SEC can
only do so much.9 As such, the need for the EC to assume its share
work on the Treaty of Rome. Id. at 40-4 1. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter EEC TREATY] arts. 85-86.
4 See, e.g., The Council Directive of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on
Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30 [hereinafter Directive].
5 Note for example the Big Bang in England and Le Petit Bourn in France.
6 Empirical data about this proportional increase is referenced in Amy E. Stutz,
Note, A New Look at the European Economic Community Directive on Insider Trading, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 137, n.8 (1990) (stating that "[Eluropean Community Commission
experts believed that the number of insider trading offenses in the EEC parallelled the
growth in European stock market activity"). See also, European Community Commission Pro-
poses Ban on Insider Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 636 (1987); Insider
Trading in Securities Subject to Coordinated Attack in the Community, [1985-1988 New Develop-
ments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 10,880 (1987). For violations of U.S.
Securities Laws, see generally, H.R. REP. No. 1065, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
7 George Graham, Regulators Lay Basis for Fraud Fight, FIN. TIMES, July 18, 1991, at
25.
8 The SEC took the initiative in persuading Congress to pass legislation increasing
its scope of authority abroad to investigate suspected violations of US securities laws in
foreign states. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of
1988 was passed pursuant to these efforts by the SEC. ITSFEA requires reciprocity by
foreign securities commissions before a foreign securities official may gather information
in the US regarding suspected violations of their country's respective laws. Michael D.
Mann & Joseph G. Mari, Developments in International Securities Law Enforcement, 683 INT'L
SEC. MKT. 821, 906 (1990). For the text of ITSFEA see Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat.
4677 (codified in 15 U.S.C.§§ 71-78 (1988)).
9 For a good review of the present laws addressing insider trading in the United
States, see Stutz, supra note 6, at 139-47. For a summary of current United States re-
sponses to Internationalization, see Michael A. Gerstenzang, Insider Trading and the Interna-
tionalization of Securities Markets, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 409, 425-41, (1989)
(addressing usage of Federal Rule 37 to compel discovery and bilateral and multilateral
agreements and explaining the rejection of the extra-territoriality approach of waiver by
conduct).
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of responsibility in this international arena cannot be underscored
enough.
Part I of this Comment briefly outlines the European Commu-
nity Directive on Insider Trading and surveys its strengths and weak-
nesses. Part II looks at the state of regulation in France, i0 using that
country as a study to ascertain how well one Member State has man-
aged to curtail insider trading over the years. Part III identifies pos-
sible avenues to eradicate the most significant shortcomings in form,
substance, and practice, and concludes by urging the adoption of a
follow-up directive to establish minimum standards of surveillance,
enforcement, and sanctioning of insider trading within the European
Community.
I. European Insider Trading Directive
A. The European Community Securities Markets
As noted before, the EC has consistently endeavored" to in-
crease the integrity of the European market as a whole by establish-
ing some bright lines of conduct to be considered undesirable or
illegal within the EC.12 The vehicle by which the Commission of the
EC aims to accomplish these objectives is the Council Directive.' 3
Although Council Directives are binding insofar as their in-
tended result must be implemented by a prescribed deadline, they
are not codified law. 14 Rather, they constitute a mandate to member
states to enact laws and regulations at the national level as may be
necessary in order to comply with (or, at least, comply with the spirit
of) the Directive by aligning national law with the common denomi-
nators they establish.' 5
10 France is chosen because it was the first European Country to enact a statutory
prohibition against insider trading as well as the first country to create a real securities
exchange commission in Europe.
I I One example of a failed effort is the Code of Conduct for transactions in transfer-
rable securities. Although this provided some ethical guidelines, the Commission made a
fatal decision in not imposing strict regulation. For the text of the guideline, see Recom-
mendation of the Commission Concerning a European Code of Conduct Relating to
Transactions in Transferrable Securities, 1977 OJ. (L 212) 37.
12 The Commission has also adopted a draft proposal for a directive prohibiting
money laundering in reaction to growing anxiety over organized crime. The directive
would require financial institutions and other large cash flow businesses to keep customer
identification on file and report suspicious transactions. In addition, money laundering
would be made a criminal offense. Council of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of Use of
Financial System for Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77.
13 Memorandum from White & Case, The European Economic Community and 1992
11 (Jan. 9, 1989)(on file at White & Case, Paris Office).
14 RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINESs TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL
122 (3d. ed. 1988)(Comparing the force of a directive with the force of an EEC regulation
which is self-executing and creating rights and obligations for Member States and their
citizens as well).
15 Two authors commenting on the Single European Act note with caution that re-
moving the power of Member States to veto any proposed legislation (by switching from a
requirement of unanimity to qualified majority voting) might have deleterious effects. In-
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The White Paper, prepared by the Commission in response to
the EC Council of Ministers' request for a detailed and scheduled
program for completion of the internal market, substantially eased
the burden on Member States to harmonize laws.16 Recognizing that
complete harmonization was often politically and substantively im-
practical, the Commission shifted its focus from harmonizing na-
tional laws to achieving mutual recognition.' 7  Relaxing the
harmonization requirement reflected the desire of the Commission
to speed the adoption of the 1992 proposals.' 8 Nevertheless, the
effect is still laudable: where some member states had no legislation
in a variety of areas of securities operations, mutual recognition
forces these states to adopt, at the very least, minimum standards.1 9
It should be noted, too, that some commentators do not view this
shift as "precluding regulatory evolution to commonality," but
rather as a first step toward actual harmonization. 20
No doubt, by issuing disclosure directives relating to stock ex-
change admissions, listing particulars, interim reports, major share-
holdings, and public offer prospecti, the EC market has become
more transparent. 21 These general disclosure directives are supple-
mented by the insider trading directive, 22 which, although problem-
atic, represents a giant step towards the healthy development of
markets and the harmonization of EC securities regulation. 23
ternal Memorandum from Ward B. Stevens, Jr. & Robert C. Creighton, What is 1992? 9
(Nov. 29, 1988)(on file at Rogers & Wells, London)(commenting that "because unanimity
is no longer required at the Council level, there are concerns that EC Directives - which
require Member States to adopt implementing legislation - may be more difficult to imple-
ment at the local (i.e. national) level than they were prior to the enactment of the Single
European Act... the dissenting Member State may well be less likely to adopt implement-
ing legislation than if it had voted in favor of the Commission's proposal").
16 See generally, LUXEMBOURG: OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (1985).
17 White & Case, supra note 13, at 5.
18 Id.
19 Non-EC member states have also increased the extent of their legislation on in-
sider trading. In Switzerland, for example, Article 161 of the Swiss Penal Code, effective
July 1, 1988, made some necessary changes in Swiss law governing insider trading. For
example, the failure in legislation to prohibit the use of insider trading by the insider
himself and not just disclosure to and use by tippees and the error in narrowly defining
inside information as a "business secret." H.R. Steiner, Switzerland, INT'L Bus. LAW, Mar.
1989, at 138, 140.
20 See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Globalization Harmonization of Securities
Laws, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 192 (1990)(explaining reciprocity as a prelude to a global
securities code). But see id. at 231 (expressing remaining concern that numerous "regula-
tory cracks" remain as the unwanted child of expediency).
21 See 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21-32; 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1-26; 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62-65; 1989
O.J. (L 124) 8-15.
22 See supra note 4.
23 In some aspects it is also a quantum leap from U.S. regulations. See, e.g., Thomas
Lee Hazen, Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons From The European Economic Community
Directive on Insider Trading, J. LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS (forthcoming 1992)(on file with
author).
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B. The EC Insider Trading Directive
A Council Directive on insider trading was first proposed in
1987,24 then revised in 1988, and finally adopted by the Council in
1989.25 The strong support for measures outlawing insider trading
is evidenced by the Council's unanimous decision on June 19, 1989
to adopt this Directive, which mandates compliance by Member
States before June 1, 1992.26
The basic purpose of the Directive is to set forth the EC's view
that insider trading endangers the smooth functioning of the internal
securities markets by undermining investor confidence. 27 Further,
the goal of the Directive is to promote the adoption of certain meas-
ures likely to foster such confidence by affording assurances to inves-
tors that "they are placed on equal footing and that they will be
protected against the improper use of inside information. ' 28
The standards proposed at the Community level are quite high.
The European Community Commission's goal is to encourage a high
level of protection in order to diminish the present uncertainty of
whether such actions are punished or rewarded. Specifically, each
state is charged with the duty to design sanctions sufficient to pro-
mote compliance. 29 Moreover, the Commission states in Article 6 of
the Directive that Member States are entitled to maintain more com-
prehensive or stringent standards at their discretion.3 0
1. Basic Elements of the Directive
The foundation of the Directive is based on Article 100(a) of the
Treaty of Rome, which states that "the Council shall, acting by quali-
fied majority on a proposal from the Commission in cooperation
24 See generally EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 111) 8 (1987).
25 See 1989 OJ. (C 277) 13.
26 Directive, supra note 4, at 32, art. 14.2. For an excellent tracking of the procedural
history leading up to the adoption of the Directive see Raffaello Fournasier, The Directive on
Insider Trading, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 149, 150 n.5 (1989-90).
27 Article 190 of the EEC Treaty requires that all regulations, directives and decisions
of the Council and the Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based. To
supplement the Directive, Member States of the Council of Europe proposed a treaty on
insider trading in September 1989. The aim of the multinational treaty is to increase
awareness and identification of illegal transactions including insider trading, giving of false
information, manipulation of securities prices and money laundering and also to facilitate
discovery in investigations. The treaty became effective on October 1, 1991. EEC TREATY
art. 190.
28 Directive, supra note 4, at 30.
29 Id. at 32, art. 13.
30 Id. at 31, art. 6. It has been argued that:
[1]t seems utterly improbable that a member state would be willing to extend
these definitions because it would probably be inequitable. [O]ne is therefore
led to believe that the formula of article 6 refers to the scope of the prohibi-
tion of insider trading and to the penalties attached to the violation of such
prohibitions, rather than the definition of insider trading.
Fournasier, supra note 26, at 164.
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with the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and
Social Committee, adopt the measures for approximation of the pro-
visions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Mem-
ber States which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market." 3' Article 1.1 of the Directive
defines "inside information" as:
Information which has not been made public of a precise nature re-
lating to one or several issuers of transferrable securities32 or to one
or several transferrable securities, which, if made public, would be
likely to have a significant effect on the price of the transferrable
security or securities in question.33
As such, inside information is non-public information of a precise
nature concerning a security or its issuer, which, if made public,
would be likely to affect its pricing.
Article 2.1 defines an "insider" as any person who:
- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, manage-
ment, or supervisory bodies of the issuer,
- by virtue of his holding in the capital of an issuer, or
- because he has access to such information by virtue of the
exercise of his employment, profession or duties, possesses
inside information from taking advantage of that informa-
tion with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or dispos-
ing of, for his own account or for the account of a third
party, either directly or indirectly, transferrable securities
of the issuer or issuers to which that information relates.3 4
Insiders fall into one of two classes: primary insiders or those ac-
quiring information via their status as employees, shareholders or
professionals, and secondary insiders or those typically referred to as
tippees.
Article 3 of the Directive outlaws three activities: trading as an
insider, disclosing inside information, and tipping or otherwise pro-
curing third parties to trade.3 5 Article Four of the Directive de-
mands the application of the insider trading prohibition to secondary
31 EEC TREATY art. 100(a). This article was added by Article 18 of the Single Euro-
pean Act. 1987 0.J. (L 169) 1. This provision rests on Article 8(a) of the Treaty of Rome
added by Article 13 of the Single European Act. Id.
32 Directive, supra note 4, at 31, art. 1.2. Art. 1.2 defines transferrable securities as:
(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities equivalent to shares and
debt securities;
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities re-
ferred to in (a);
(c) futures contracts, options and financial futures in respect of securities
referred to in (a);
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in (a) when admitted
to trading on a market which is regulated and supervised by authorities rec-
ognized by public bodies, operates regularly and is accessible directly or indi-
rectly to the public.
33 Id. art. 1.1.
34 Id. art. 2.1.
35 Id. art. 3.
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insiders, or more commonly, tippees.3 6 The prohibition, however,
extends only to "first generation" tippees leaving the Member States
the prerogative for further extension to remote tippees.3 7
Next, warranted attention is given to the process of determining
the locus of violations. This Article simplifies this difficult process
with a general rule that a violation is committed at the place of mar-
ket execution. 38 License for exchange of information between Mem-
ber States is also established with a view to facilitating each state's
capabilities for detection and investigation.3 9 Finally, Member States
are given discretion with regard to the implementation of sanctions,
so long as the methods chosen are sufficient to promote compliance
with measures specified by the Directive. 40
2. Strengths of the Directive
The plain fact that the Commission actually issued the Directive
is widely recognized as a major step in the right direction since a
majority of Europeans have long viewed these otherwise controver-
sial activities as time-honored traditions.
The legal basis of the Directive is also commendable. The origi-
nal proposal of the Directive rested on Article 54( 3 )(g) of the Treaty
of Rome, which implicitly directs the focus on the harmonization of
fair behavior standards towards investors. This in turn, necessarily
gives attention to fraud analysis and fiduciary duty considerations. 4 '
However, as noted above, the legal basis of the Directive as adopted
is Article 100(a), 4 2 which focuses instead on streamlining the func-
tion of the unified securities markets to enhance the overall efficiency
of the marketplace.4 3 The Directive's basis is important because it
necessarily has a bearing on the interpretation of a given act.4 4 Pro-
ponents of the change in basis note that although it seems that con-
cern for the individual investor is displaced, the change is likely to
enable respective authorities to indirectly, but more effectively, serve
consumer interests by providing a more simplistic evaluation
36 Id. art. 4.
37 Id. art. 6.
38 Id. art. 5. Actions may, however, be brought in other states as well.
39 Id. at 32, art. 10.2.
40 Id. art. 13.
41 For an excellent discussion on the motivation behind the change in legal basis, see
Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Regulation of lnsider Trading in the European Community, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1037, 1048-1049 (1991). The text of Article 54 (3)(g) of the Treaty of
Rome reads "[tihe Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon
them under the preceding provisions, in particular "by coordinating to the necessary ex-
tent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are
required by Member States of companies or firms . . . with a view to making such safe-
guards equivalent throughout the Community." EEC TREATY art. 54(3).
42 Directive, supra note 4, at 30.
43 Id.
44 Fournasier, supra note 26, at 156.
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Consistent with the approbation of this change in the legal basis,
the Directive is hailed by many commentators for its bold move in
actually defining illegal insider trading4 6 precisely and comprehen-
sively. 47 In particular, authors who compare the EC Directive with
the present status of insider trading laws in the US are particularly
pleased with the way the Directive clearly demarcates to whom the
prohibition extends; in particular, to persons not in a fiduciary or
other special relationship vis-a-vis the entity whose information is be-
ing used.48
The fact that the Directive expressly provides for cooperation by
competent authorities for exchange of information between EC
Member States aids in the enforcement of respective insider trading
laws. 49 Similarly, the inclusion of the companion provision allowing
the EC to conclude similar agreements with non-EC countries to fos-
ter efforts toward enforcement worldwide is applauded by commen-
tators optimistic that blocking and banking secrecy laws 50 will be
effectively bypassed as a result. 5 1
3. Weaknesses of the Directive
Although the Directive has been widely praised, loopholes do
exist. One commentator notes that the Directive's failure to explic-
itly require Member States to extend the anti-tipping provision to
secondary insiders is effectively disabling. 52 The focus of these crit-
45 Warren, supra note 41, at 1054-55.
46 See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 23.
47 See, Fournasier, supra note 26, at 163 (commenting that "[n]ot only are these defi-
nitions precise enough to warrant uniform implementation in all Member States, but they
are so comprehensive that it is difficult to imagine what could be left, as far as the defini-
tion of insider trading is concerned, to Member States discretion .....
48 See Hazen, supra note 23.
49 Directive, supra note 4, at 32, art. 10. Section 1 of this article is qualified by § 2
which provides:
The competent authorities may refuse to act on a request for information:
(a) where communication of the information might adversely affect the sov-
ereignty, security or public policy of the State addressed;
(b) where judicial proceedings have already been initiated in respect of the
same actions and against the same persons before the authorities of the state
addressed or where final judgement has already been passed on such persons
for the same actions by the competent authorities of the state addressed.
Id.
50 Blocking laws protect state interests while secrecy laws protect the privacy of the
individual parties. For an overview of various secrecy and blocking laws see Michael D.
Mann & Joseph G. Mari, Current Issues in International Law Enforcement, 614 INT'L SEC. MKT.
9, 68-71 (1988).
51 Directive, supra note 4, at 32, art. 11; see also, Problems with the SEC s Enforcement of
U.S. Securities Laws in Cases Involving Suspicious Trades Originating from Abroad, H.R. REP. No.
1065, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, n.63 (1988)(expressing the Congressional description of the
process of "layering").
52 See Hazen, supra note 23. Hazen further comments that the EC affirmative disclo-
sure mandate is over regulatory (manuscript at 6-7)(cautioning about overregulation and
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icisms is the perceived failure by the drafters in making this an ele-
ment of the Directive rather than an option for the Member States to
select.
Further, market shopping, or regulatory arbitrage, 53 may not be
sufficiently curtailed. Given the disparity of legal systems and ex-
isting regulations of Member States, there has not been a high de-
gree of consistency in the style of enacted regulations.54 Prior to the
adoption of the EC Directive, France and Great Britain already had
in place the most extensive insider trading regulations of the EC
member states. 55 While only minor changes needed to be made to
achieve compliance in these countries, primary legislation was neces-
sary in Italy, Belgium and Ireland, and drastic changes were required
in Germany and Luxembourg, which previously relied on self-regula-
tory mechanisms. 56 Understandably, laws and attitudes in each
country regarding insider trading are evolving at different rates. The
fear of regulatory arbitrage is therefore very real.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Commission has
established no institutional mechanisms for surveillance, coordina-
tion or enforcement to support its regulatory blueprint. Even if reg-
ulatory disparities dissipate, if no commensurate efforts are made to
perfect enforcement, the Directive will remain toothless. On the
darkest side, one commentator confronts the tacit reality that, as a
method of combatting intensive competition, Member States them-
selves may ipsofacto encourage arbitrageurs and discourage compe-
tent enforcement. 57 In addition, the standards set forth in the
Directive are by no means harmonious with US law and are therefore
necessarily limited in application to Member States. 58
Overall, the Directive is condemned as purely academic in its
pursuits; as it stands now, the Directive is in danger of falling into
disrepute if effective enforcement is not accomplished. Originally
stating that encouraging prompt disclosure is one thing, but mandating it is quite
another).
53 See Warren, supra note 20, at 189-90 (describing the basis of the fear of regulatory
arbitrage).
54 While there are aspects of both the French and British pre-existing insider trading
laws in the EC Insider trading Directive, only Belgium and Luxembourg have elected to
closely follow the wording of the Directive. Eddy 0. Wymeerch, EEC Booklet, INr'L SEC.
REG. (Robert C. Rosen, ed.)(1991).
55 Lucy Kellaway, Insider Dealing: EC Member States Prepare Rules for 1992, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1990, § 1, at 8.
56 Italy and Belgium have been slow runners in many areas of implementation. After
missing the October 1, 1989 deadline for implementing national laws sufficient to comply
with the UCITS directive, which addresses worldwide trading of unit trusts, the Commis-
sion sent out warning letters demanding an explanation for failure to comply. 1988 O.J. (L
100) 123; White & Case, supra note 13, at 5.
57 See Warren, supra note 20, at 232 (noting that economic benefits are unlikely to be
shared equally among the Member States and that these inequalities may disrupt what
harmony has been achieved).
58 Gerstenzang, supra note 9, at 439.
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the European Parliament made extensive proposals for harmoniza-
tion of penalties, civil remedies, or criminalization of insider trading;
unfortunately, these proposals were ultimately rejected.5 9
As adopted, the Directive merely provides that each Member
State shall determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of
the measures taken, but that penalties must be sufficient to promote
compliance. 60 In the event that a Member State's enactments are
questionable they will be subject to review by the Commission and, if
necessary the European Court ofJustice, where a final determination
on sufficiency will be made.6 1 Although broad interpretations of the
Directive do allow for such sanctions to take penal, administrative or
civil forms, express language is necessary to eradicate this fatal flaw
in the legislation. 62
Other commentators criticize the Directive's failure to address a
more austere problem - the insurance of competent adjudication. 63
These authors note that even if surveillance and enforcement mecha-
nisms are established by the different Member States and are facially
sufficient,judges in most EC countries treat insider trading as "a gen-
tlemanly misunderstanding rather than a crime." 64  The need,
therefore, for harmonized, stringent, and enforceable laws and pen-
59 European Parliament on Proposal from the Commission to the Council for a Direc-
tive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading, 1988 O.J. (C 187) 90, 92-93.
60 Directive, supra note 4, at 32, art. 13.
61 COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 6 (1991).
62 Fournasier, supra note 26, at 166 (noting that the decision to make insider trading a
criminal offense, administrative offense, or a tort is linked to the margin of discretion of
Member States).
63 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 20, at 189-90.
64 Id. Credit is to be given, however, to the French judge handling the second heavily
publicized incident of insider trading in France, L'Affaire Pechiney. Judge Boizette has
continued to pursue the investigation after numerous pitfalls and dead ends thanks to
recent headway precipitated by newly acquired trading information from Switzerland. LE
FIGARO, Nov. 14, 1989, at 1.
Discovery of L'Affaire Pechiney came as a result of an SEC led investigation into the
trading of securities in a U.S. packing company, Triangle Industries, Inc. on the New York
Stock Exchange. L'Affaire Pechiney as it came to be called involved a takeover bid for
Triangle Industries by the state-owned metals company, Pechiney S.A. The substantial
increase in foreign trading of the securities of Triangle Industries just prior to the public
announcement of the takeover bid tipped off the S.E.C. that insider trading might be the
cause of one-third of the orders originating from France. See Andy Rosenbaum, French
Insider Dealing Case Threatens Minister, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 18, 1991, at 23.
As Pechiney was a largely state owned company, the investigation implicated persons
in the French government, including Alain Boublil, former chief aide of France's Finance
Minister, Pierre Beregevoy and close friends of President Francois Mitterrand. See Former
Beregovoy Aide Accused in Pechiney Trangle Case, Proprietary to the United Press International
(Paris), Nov. 7, 1991. Boublil has been charged with providing information to French and
foreign investors regarding the Pechiney bid; however, legal experts in Paris say that the
fact that he is not facing charges of deriving personal profit will make it extremely difficult
to prove him guilty. Id. The investigation is still ongoing and it marks the first time an
indictment has taken place.
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alties is plain. 65
With these weaknesses in mind, an examination of the imple-
mentation of insider trading laws in a Member State is in order.
France has been chosen because it was the first European country to
enact a statutory prohibition against insider trading.66 Furthermore,
France serves as a mature case study to ascertain the likelihood of




Insider trading legislation has existed in France since 1967,67
and was amended and upgraded in 1970,68 1982,69 and again in
198870 and 1989, after the first big insider trading scandals in France
created a plethora of publicity and embarrassment for government
officials indirectly implicated in the affair.7 Prior to this, the veil
65 See, e.g., Douglas A. Nystrom, Note, The Effects of the New EEC Draft Insider Trading
Directive, 18 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 139-141 (1988); Christine A. McGuinness, Note,
Toward the Unification of European Capital Markets: The EEC'S Proposed Directive on Insider Trad-
ing, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 432, 449 n.Il (1988).
66 See Ordonnance No. 67-833, 1967 J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373.
67 Id.
68 Loi No. 70-1208, 1970 J.O. 11,891, 1971 D.S.L. 17 (amending Ordonnance No.
67-833, Art 10).
69 Loi No. 82-1172, 1982J.O. 15, 1983 D.S.L. 86.
70 Loi No. 88-70, 1988 J.O. 1111, 1988 D.S.L. 133.
71 The first major insider trading incident, known as the Soci&t Generale scandal
involved allegations that an investment group improperly bought and sold shares of the
French bank, based on alleged information and involvement by French government offi-
cials. This was the first insider trading case which damaged the reputation of the socialist
government and implicated officials and close friends of President Mitterand. See generally
Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 23; Christopher Elliot, DTI Was About To Quiz Maxwell In
Share Deals Inquiry, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 10, 1991, at 1.
At the time initial inquiries were made into Soci&t Generale trading, the COB had a
relatively toothless image, but recently the COB has managed to play a foraging role in
attempts to resolve the case. At present a Lebanese businessman is facing charges of in-
sider dealing in connection with the Soci&6 Generale stock and is on bail awaiting trial. Id.
The investigation is, however, still ongoing and interestingly, one of the chief witnesses,
British publisher and tycoon, and friend of Mitterand, Robert Maxwell died mysteriously
in November, 199 1,just after the COB had requested Britain's Trade and Industry Minis-
try to interview Maxwell as a witness in the French investigation. Of course, this will prove
to be a setback in the investigation but at least it seems that the COB is breaking ground in
hopes of shattering its previously toothless image.
For a full and colorful account of the circumstances leading up to Maxwell's death, see
Trevor Fishlock, Focus on the Death of a Magnate Maxwell: Mystery of the Lost Tycoon, Today in
Jerusalem Maxwell Will be Buried, But the Questions Surrounding His Death Will Not Be Laid to Rest,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 10, 1991, at 16. See also Family Lawyer Says Maxwell May Have
Been Murdered, THE REUrER Bus. REPORT (Spain), Nov. 10, 1991; Publisher Maxwell Buried in
Jerusalem; Investigation: Hands Aboard the Tycoon's Yacht Are Told Not to Leave the Canary Islands
as a Probe Into the British Publisher's Mysterious Death Continues, L.A.TImEs, Monday, Nov. 11,
1991, at D2. Officials from the British department of trade are now in charge of monitor-
ing the Serious Fraud Office Investigation. As for the status of the COB's requests, the
British "Home Office," which is the authority charged with the duty of handling overseas
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over the French corporate world allowed access to information only
by the privileged few who freely enjoyed the traditional raping of the
fruits of their employment. 72
The first step motivating change occurred when the French gov-
ernment decided to promote Paris as an international financial mar-
ket and encourage wider public investment on the French Bourse. 73
Enabling and implementing legislation was accordingly passed. The
Ordinance of September 28, 1967 created the Commission des Op-
erations de Bourse ("COB"), the French watchdog equivalent of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission. 74 The COB is
a government agency responsible for insuring the protection of sav-
ings invested in securities and other types of investments giving rise
to public offerings. 75 Like the SEC, the COB also provides checks to
monitor the sufficiency and accuracy of information provided to
investors. 76
According to the ordinance, the COB's role is to oversee the
smooth functioning of the markets for negotiable securities, quoted
financial products and negotiable futures contracts. 77 In addition,
the COB has regulatory power concerning market functions and pro-
fessional practice rules applicable to persons making public offerings
and related professionals who participate in or manage public offer-
ings and other portfolio securities. 78
requests for help, has as yet to comment about the affair. Stewart Tendler, DTI Will Keep
Watch On Fraud Investigation, The Times, Dec. 6, 1991.
72 BARRY A.K. RIDER & H. LEIGH FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 234
(1979).
73 Francois Duhot, French Regulations on Disclosure Obligations and Insider Trading, 2 INr'L
Bus. LAw. 96, 96 (1974). "Bourse" is the European term for stock exchange.
French authorities have taken three basic measures to facilitate international
activity:
(i) lightening foreign exchange control regulations;
(ii) modernizing the French Stock Exchange to increase its use by
foreign issuers and investors;
(iii) making an effort to harmonize stock exchange regulations within
the EEC, and cultivating international cooperation between the
COB and its equivalent foreign commissions.
HARMONISATION PROJECT VOL. II, INT'L BAR Ass'N, SEC. ON Bus. LAw 28-29.
74 Ordonnance No. 67-833, 1967J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373. French Constitutional
law provides that the judiciary branch is kept separate from the executive branch. How-
ever, the legislature felt that effective management of the markets merited the formation of
an administrative body with powers of referral to the courts. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note
72, at 233. Before the COB was created, the French markets were regulated by the Comite
des Bourses de Valeur in conjunction with the Chambre Syndicale. Id.
75 HARMONISATION PROJECT, supra note 73, at 3.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. The COB is aided by two professional entities which enjoy legal status: the
Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs ("the CBV" or, in English, the Stock Exchange Council)




Inside information is statutorily defined, 79 and French courts
have interpreted the statute to cover information that is precise, spe-
cific and certain.80 "Inities" or insiders may not complete a stock ex-
change transaction or knowingly permit the completion of the same
by another on the basis of such information prior to public notifica-
tion.8' As clarified by COB regulations, the law prohibits any kind of
trading, be it direct or indirect, by the Chairman of the Board, Presi-
dent, Vice President, general managers, directors (and their spouses)
or persons who, by virtue of their professional activity, possess privi-
leged information about an issuer or about a potential fluctuation in
the price of a security, futures contract or options contract.8 2 The
category of indirect insiders is given broad interpretation by French
courts, which have found, for example, journalists and architects
guilty of insider trading.83
In addition, anti-fraud provisions provide that anyone who
knowingly disseminates to the public false or misleading information
concerning the prospectus or situation of an issuer or a security
which could affect the price of a listed corporation's shares is liable
with the same sanctions applying as under violations of insider trad-
ing rules.84 Further, Article 10-3 of Ordinance 67-833 of Septem-
ber 28, 1967 regulates related insider transactions intended to
manipulate share prices.8 5
Two significant changes in the law were made in response to the
EC Directive. First, French insider trading laws formerly governed
only those transactions that took place on official stock exchanges
and did not apply to over-the-counter transactions (hors-cote).86 The
standard set forth in the EC Directive demanded application to any
transferrable security admitted to trading on a stock exchange, be the
security actually traded on or off the exchange or through a profes-
sional intermediary.8 7 Second, the Directive prompted the French to
79 See Andre Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities Regu-
lation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 762 (1982) (translating Loi No. 70-1208, art. 4).
80 Compagnie Francaise d'Enterprise, 1978J.C.P. II No. 18,879 (Cour d'appel, Paris,
May 26, 1977), reprinted in 10A Int'l Capital Mkt. & Sec. Reg. § 7.16[2] 7-38 (1 st ed. 1989).
81 JosephJ. Smallhoover, International Law Practice Files (1991)(on file at the law offices
of S.G. Archibald, Paris).
82 Id. The original 1967 law had a reporting requirement effective as to all directors,
officers and key executives and applying to all securities transactions. As this imposed a
heavy administrative burden on the COB, the wording was changed (at the COB's request)
to a more broad prohibition on insider trading. This change was incorporated in Law No.
701208 of December 23, 1970 which amended Article 10-1 of the 1967 ordinance. Ordon-
nance No. 67-833, 1967 J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373.
83 Stutz, supra note 6, at 159.
84 Ordonnnance No. 67-833, 1967 J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373.
85 Smallhoover, supra note 81 (manuscript at 12).
86 22 Sec. and Commodities Reg. 137, 143 (1989).
87 Id.
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extend their insider trading laws. Secondary insiders, tippers and
tippees who were not expressly covered by the French laws prior to
1989 are now included. 88
Although strict construction of the Ordinance does not, per se,
prohibit tippees from trading on the information, Article 460 of the
French Penal Code, which makes it a crime to knowingly receive ob-
jects stolen, taken away, or misappropriated, has recently been in-
voked to curtail this activity.8 9
The September 1967 Ordinance defines and provides penal
sanctions for the criminal offense of insider trading.90 Investigations
are conducted by the COB. 91 Any individual who takes any action to
impede a COB investigation is also guilty of a criminal offense. 92
Although some investigations have been initiated by the COB and it
seems that these numbers will rise,93 to date the ultimate number of
suits actually filed by the public prosecutor is quite low and certainly
does not reflect the number of violations committed. 94 In the cases
that do arise, the COB's opinion must be filed and is typically a pow-
erful exhibit in the case. 95 In practice, the Courts rule in favor of the
Commission's position. 96 Given the COB's recent "get tough" atti-
tude, the Courts are likely to follow suit.9 7
This more aggressive approach was motivated by the legisla-
tures' broadening of the COB's investigatory powers in response to
widespread criticisms. 98 In large part, these legislative changes at-
tempt to remodel the COB to more closely resemble its original
model, the SEC.99 Law No. 89-531 of August 2, 1989 contains a
88 Id.
89 Michael D. Mann & Lisa A. Lustgarten, Internalization ofInsider Trading Enforcement: A
Guide to Regulation and Cooperation, 743 INT'L SEc. MKT. 491, 501 (1991).
90 Ordonnance No. 67-833, 1967 J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373.
91 Criminal prosecutions themselves are handled by public prosecutors. HARMONISA-
TION PROJECT, supra note 73, at 9.
92 Id. at 3.
93 Although the COB may initiate investigations, the COB may not file suit itself as
the SEC can. See Bill to Strengthen COB Approved By French Cabinet, 2 Int'l. Sec. Reg. Rep. 4
(BNA) (Mar. 15, 1989); Council Slows COB's Progress on Path to Independence, 2 Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep. 3 (BNA) (Aug. 2, 1989).
94 Michael Shields, Insider Trading Becoming Less Acceptable in Europe, THE REUTER LIBR.
REP. (Zurich), Dec. 2, 1989.
95 RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 72, at 233.
96 Interview with Joseph Smallhoover, Law Offices of S.C. Archibald, Paris, France
(Sept. 1991).
97 RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 72, at 233.
98 This increase in investigatory power is found in Law No. 88-70 of January 22,
1988, incorporated into Ordonnance of September 28, 1967. 1967J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L.
373.
99 The SEC model and ITSFEA component have nonetheless been widely criticized.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2, at 133 (concluding that although Congress acknowledges




number of provisions which emulate the SEC regulations. 0 0 First,
the statute enables the COB to require the production of documents
and testimony from any person or entity.' 0 ' Second, the new law
allows the COB to question suspects and obtain search and seizure
orders.10 2 Third, in addition to enabling the COB to obtain freezing
of assets orders,' 0 3 the law now grants the COB the power to impose
sanctions for insider trading violations in the form of administrative
fines in the amount of 6,000 to 10,000,000 francs' 0 4 or ten times the
profit derived from the prohibited securities transactions, as well as
fines of 10,000 to 100,000 francs for tipping.' 0 5 It also enables the
COB to sanction those individuals who refuse to comply with its
requests. 10 6
The COB's budget has quadrupled in size since 1985 as a result
of substantial increases in funding. 10 7 Now estimated at $17 million,
the budget is proportional to that of the SEC, considering market
size. As a result, the COB can now employ 210 people, which is
roughly double the number employed in 1985.108 The number pre-
siding on the governing board was duly increased from five to nine
members to reflect these increases in funding and manpower.' 0 9
With regard to the Directive's provision on agreements with its
foreign counterparts, the COB has entered into bilateral agreements
with other EC and non-EC states pledging mutual cooperation in se-
curities law enforcement. 0 The first in this series of agreements
was with the SEC on December 14, 1989. To be sure, the relation-
ship between the COB and the SEC has always been relatively
strong, but prior to the enactment of Article 5 Bis of Law No. 89-
531, the COB's powers were greatly constrained by French law limit-
100 Law of August 2, 1989, incorporated into Ordonnance of September 28, 1967.
1967J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373.
101 Prior to this the COB could only subpoena stock market professionals. Id. (article 2
amending article 5B of the Sept. 28, 1967 Ordonnance).
102 Id. art. 5.
103 Id. art. 8-1.
104 Ten million French Francs is roughly the equivalent of $1.6 Million. WALL ST. J.,
April 20, 1992, at C5.
105 Law of August 2, 1989, incorporated into Ordannance of September 28, 1967.
1967J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373, art. 9-2. Prior to this one of the strongest weapons the
COB could resort to was publicizing the details of the case. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note
72, at 239.
106 For a description of the status quo prior to sanctioning, see Robert Bordeaux-
Groult, Problems of Enforcement and Cooperation in the Multinational Securities Market: A French
Perspective, 9 U. PA.J. Irr'L Bus. L. 453, 455 (1987).
107 Prior to these increases, the French Government was criticized for its hypocritical
desire for public confidence in the integrity of its markets without any complementary
grant of resources or provisions. RMDER & FFRENCH, supra note 72, at 239.
108 Steven Greenhouse, Global Investing-A Special Report: France An Old Club Trans-
formed, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at D6.
109 French Watchdog Unit Policies Stock Market, L.A. TIMES, Oct.18, 1989, at D3.
110 La COB et la SIB Anglaise Signent Un Pacte de Diontologie, LA TRIBUNE, 21 Mars 1990.
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ing disclosure to foreign authorities."' The old legislation essen-
tially forbade nationals from divulging economic, commercial,
industrial, financial or technical matters to foreign authorities absent
explicit agreement." 12 Before 1989, the French blocking law was, for
all intents and purposes, widely applied. Indeed, in the 1984 case,
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. ,' 13 the U.S. District Court ruled the French
blocking law virtually impassable." 14
The new law which amends prior law on insider trading and is
similar to the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act
of 1988,115 grants the COB the authority to use its powers in aiding
foreign securities authorities who request assistance in investigations
within their foreign jurisdiction." 16 The key concept is reciproc-
ity. 1 7 The COB may only assist authorities from those countries
whose laws provide for reciprocal assistance to the COB." 8
The SEC/COB agreement is bifurcated. The first in the series is
an agreement providing for exchange of information between the
two authorities pursuant to inquiries regarding possible violations of
the securities laws of each country." 9 There are two basic limita-
tions on this provision. First and foremost, the COB need not and in
fact must not, comply with such requests if compliance would endan-
ger France's sovereignty, essential economic interests, or public or-
der. 120 Second, requests for information may not be honored where
criminal proceedings have either commenced,' 2 ' a final decision has
I I I The law referred to here is the French blocking law, No. 80-538 ofJuly 16, 1980,
reprinted in Internationalization of the Securities Markets, Report of the Staff of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, VII-33 (July 27, 1987).
112 Id.
113 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Il. 1984).
114 Gerstenzang, supra note 9, at 423.
115 For a brief outline of the law as originally proposed and as adopted, see Thomas,
supra note 2, at 117-21.
116 HARMONISATION PROJECT, supra note 73, at 5-7.
117 See 1967 J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373.
118 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission News Release No. 89115.-85, dated De-
cember 14, 1989. However, neither the SEC nor the COB have shown much initiative in
investigating possible violations originating from states which have not respectively exe-
cuted bilateral accords.
119 Administrative Agreement between the United States Securities Exchange Com-
mission and Republique Francaise Commission des Operations de Bourse, dated Decem-
ber 14, 1989.
120 Id.
121 Before the negotiation of the SEC/COB accord, the only authority under which
the SEC had to request information under was the Hague Convention. Complete analysis
of such proceedings must include reference to the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, designed to facilitate evidence gathering
by providing the structure of Letters of Request. The basic governing principle, as stated
by the Chairman of the convention is that "any system of obtaining evidence or securing
the performance of other judicial acts internationally must be 'tolerable' in the state of
execution and must also be 'utilizable' in the forum of the state of origin where the action
is pending. MAARTEN KLUWER, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE
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been rendered in France, or sanctions have already been imposed in
a matter arising from the same facts and circumstances.1 22 This
agreement is unusual when compared to Memoranda of Understand-
ing entered into between other foreign securities authorities, be-
cause it is only the second of its kind to actually obligate each agency
to provide such mutual assistance.' 23
The second part of the SEC/COB agreement, known as the
French Understanding, provides a framework for cooperation and
consultation between the authorities in order to coordinate market
oversight, and to resolve differences that may exist between the re-
spective regulatory systems.124 The two parts together make the re-
lationship between the COB and the SEC unmatched by other
countries.' 2 5 As such, the agreement has been hailed as the strong-
est element of French law on insider trading.
Memoranda of Understanding preceding the French agreement
should be amended and reworded to insure that the agreement is
binding and compliance is obligated. To be sure, the French/U.S.
accord must withstand the test of time and variety of human trans-
gressions through regular use. However, it can be considered a
turning point in the French effort to control the fallout caused by the
increased internationalization of the world's securities markets. Un-
fortunately, it may also be testimony to the degree to which the COB
is dependent on the troubleshooting abilities of the SEC. The
COB's next step is to fortify its own methods of surveillance in the
CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COM-
MERCIAL MATrERS 20 (1984). The explanatory report states that:
In broad outline, the Convention seeks to -
a. improve the existing system of letters of Request; and
b. enlarge the devices for the taking of evidence by increasing the pow-
ers of consuls and by introducing, on a limited basis, the concept of
commissioner; and at the same time
c. preserve all existing more favorable and less restrictive practices re-
sulting from internal law, internal rules of procedure and bilateral
and multilateral conventions.
Id.
122 The new law does, however, allow for collaboration. Id.
123 An accord with the Netherlands three days prior was the first. In general, Memo-
randa of Understanding do not carry the same status as treaties, but as such, enter into
force upon signature and require no ratification by the Senate or its foreign equivalent.
Astrid R. Baumgardner, "SEC/COB Agreements" The French Perspective, N.Y. L.J., June 21,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
124 Understanding between the United States Securities Exchange Commission and
Republique Francaise Commission des Operations de Bourse, dated December 14 1989.
125 These and similar efforts have been commended by recent authors who acknowl-
edge that "legal and attitudinal changes, both in the U.S and worldwide, regarding insider
trading has changed the enforcement landscape in dramatic ways over the past fifteen
years." Stuart J. Baskin, Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & INV. REG. HANDBOOK (Jerry Markham,
Peter Farmery, Keith Walmsley, Eric Roiter & Michael Grison, eds., forthcoming 1992).
Baskin comments that both the theories and practices of insider trading enforcement have
become broadly accepted and expanded as regulators and prosecutors aggressively seek to
police perceived systemic defects in the world's securities markets. Id.
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spirit of the United States Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act' 26 by enlisting its market institutions to share the
watchdog's responsibility. 1
27
C. Overall Analysis of French Regulation of Insider Trading
Although the French can be congratulated for their primacy in
providing a regulatory model of insider trading, concern still re-
mains that such regulations are superficial due to the lack of adminis-
trative requirements for disclosure and methods of surveillance and
enforcement. 128 Although recent cases served to increase public
awareness and induce efforts to police insider trading, it is question-
able that French participants in the world markets consider insider
trading as immoral behavior. 12 9 Perhaps the COB's recent crack-
down signifies a new era. Although twenty-five years have passed
since insider trading was initially proscribed, the new laws and agree-
ments require a longer test period before investors should place
their confidence in the French markets. To date, the COB is still
being accused of laxity in the use of its new power to impose civil
fines, in handing relatively few cases over to the public prosecu-
tor,13 0 and in merely persuading people to reverse their transactions
rather than to institute formal action.' 3 1
III. Possible Future Avenues
If the EC is serious about enforcing insider trading violations,
the Community must work to achieve a high level of coordination
and cooperation among Member States and other countries. 13 2 A
number of alternatives should be explored: first, the issuance of a
supplementary directive or an amendment of the existing Directive
to specifically set forth enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for
insider trading;' 3 3 second, the creation of an EC securities commis-
sion;' 3 4 third, the negotiation of an EC securities commission Memo-
randum of Understanding with the United States and other countries
similar to the bilateral agreement between the COB and the SEC;
and fourth, the exploration of the benefits of establishing a workable
supranational regulatory body.' 3 5
126 For an overview of this act see id. (manuscript at 14-16, on file with author).
127 See Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in 15 U.S.C.).
128 Cf COB Draws Up Tougher Insider Trading Rules, Iwr'L SEC. REG. REP., May 21, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
129 See Shields, supra note 94.
l0 See Baumgardner, supra note 123, at 5.
131 See Greenhouse, supra note 108, at DI, D6.
132 Cf KlausJ. Hopt, The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 51,
74-76 (1990)(noting it is sometimes more effective to have loose guidelines).
133 Id.
l34 This idea was first proposed by RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 72, at 234.
135 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 20 at 231-32 (discussing such an international body).
[VOL. 17
EC SECURITIES DIRECTIVE
To date, uniformity in enforcement has been idealistic, leaving
original goals like the curtailment of market shopping unattained.13 6
It is important for the legislature of each EC Member State to
strengthen the national law by studying the lessons learned by
France, other member states, and non-EC nations. Civil remedies
aimed at insider trader profits should be effected in all states as they
have proven to be a powerful mechanism of enforcement and deter-
rence in the U.S., where the law demands disgorgement of profits,
confiscation of directors' short swing gains, and other remedies for
off-market trading. 37 Further, civil and criminal enforcement mech-
anisms should be made fundamental by issuing an enforcement di-
rective to insure that the passing of the initial Insider Trading
Directive will prove to be more than a mere academic exercise.' 3 8 In
executing this endeavor, other defects may be cured along the way.
For example, one author suggests that the Commission's reserva-
tions regarding stipulation of tippee liability can be remedied "by
providing well defined mens rea rules and by attaching legal signifi-
cance to institutional precautions against tips." 139
However, there may be a fundamental legal problem in that Ar-
ticle 189 of the Treaty of Rome may proscribe a more specific
amended or follow-up directive. Although it states that a regulation
shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States, Article 189 provides that a "directive shall be binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is ad-
dressed, but shall leave the national authorities the choice of forms
and methods."' 40 However, other EC directives have reached far-
ther into the state realm of prescription than the Treaty of Rome
seemingly allows. As the EC matures, it seems that clarification or
amendment of Article 189 will become necessary; the insider trading
directive is but one example of this basic problem plaguing the ma-
jority of legislation passed by the EC.
If its creation is authorized, the European securities commission
For other views on possible remedies for weaknesses in the directive, see, e.g., Gerstenzang,
supra note 9, at 439-41.
136 New Belgium and Luxembourg legislation modelled after the EC directive support
this goal. See Wymeerch, supra note 54.
137 Patrick F. Wallace, Who is Subject to the Prohibition Against Insider Trading: A Compari-
son of American, French, and British Law, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 217, 279 (1985).
138 However, The Hague Convention only assists evidence gathering in civil and com-
mercial matters, and does not address criminal proceedings. See KLUWER, SUpra note 121 at
20. Still, whatever the nature of the proceedings, there is general agreement that the prin-
ciple advocating that sanctions should remain in the exclusive prerogative of Member
States should be abandoned. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 41 at 1074.
139 Wallace, supra note 137, at 280.
140 EEC TREATY art. 189. See also Hopt, supra note 132, at 74 (noting that Article 13 of
the Directive follows the traditional pattern of leaving it to the discretion of the Member
States to determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures taken
pursuant to the Directive).
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could consist of members of the different states led by a panel
charged with the responsibility of proposing recommendations on
surfacing issues. It might also provide a Member State's commission
with a method of appeal when a national judge renders a decision
arguably conflicting with the spirit of the Directive.' 4 1 Once a Euro-
pean securities commission is established, negotiation of a United
States-EC Memorandum of Understanding in the spirit of the
SEC/COB Administrative Agreement would be one step away. Such
an agreement would be beneficial because it would expedite the
processing of requests for information and the handling of cases by
making the process systematic.' 42 Individualized bilateral memo-
randa of understanding might then concentrate on the special needs
of each market.
The creation of a European securities commission and the nego-
tiation of an EC/US Memorandum of Understanding are, however,
unlikely at best. The refusal of Member States to relinquish political
sovereignty inevitably perpetuates resistance to harmonization and
total integration. Thus, the chances of attaining the degree of polit-
ical cooperation which these alternatives necessitate is remote.
Nonetheless, the adoption of the Insider Trading Directive is a clas-
sic initial step to European integration in accord with Schuman's
prophesy that "Europe will not be made all at once, or as a single
whole; it will be built of concrete achievements which first create de
facto solidarity."' 43
Indeed, if the Member States of the European Community over-
come the present obstacles and implement these alternatives, the Eu-
ropean securities commission could then effectively serve as a
prototype for the development of an international regulatory com-
mission. 144 The establishment of this body would be instrumental in
fostering confidence in the world's markets by promoting integ-
rity.' 45 One organization known as the International Organization
of Securities Commissions seems to be independently working to-
wards this end. 146 However, global regulatory consensus is the nec-
141 See Warren, supra note 20, at 231 (suggesting that the EC regulatory institution
might be organized either as special body of the EC Commission or as an independent
agency).
142 22 Sec. and Commodities Reg. 137, 146-47 (July 5, 1989).
143 See Paxton, supra note I at 228.
144 Warren, supra note 20, at 232."
145 For one discussion of such a world wide regulatory agency see Gerstenzang, supra
note 9, at 439.
146 The organization, headquartered in Montreal, charges itself with four basic aims:
- to cooperate together to ensure a better regulation of the markets, on
the domestic as well as on the international level in order to maintain
just and efficient securities markets;
- to exchange information on their respective experiences in order to
promote the development of domestic markets;
- to unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance
of international securities transactions;
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- to provide mutual assistance to ensure the integrity of the markets by
rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement
against offenses.
1990 INT'L COMMODITIES. OF SEC. COMM'N ANN. REP. at 14.
As published in its annual report, International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) now boasts eighty members. Although some of these are not regular mem-
bers but rather associates or affiliates, whatever the numbers, the rate at which
membership in the organization has increased is evidence of the desire among member
securities commissions to work together to achieve beneficial economic and ethical results
in their respective markets. Id. at 1.
The Rio Declaration is further evidence. Signed by thirty three members in 1990, the
declaration calls upon members to provide assistance on a reciprocal basis in the gathering
of information related to the market oversight and protection of investors against fraudu-
lent securities transactions. A contact person is designated to expedite the processing of
all requests for assistance. Id.
Another effort being made by IOSCO is led by its Technical Committee which has set
up a Working Group for Enforcement and Exchange of Information to identify problems
in negotiating and with existing Memoranda. Id. at 4.
147 Id.

